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HIGH SCHOOL HAIR REGULATIONS
INTRODUCTION
The controversy over the length of male students' hair is becoming
an increasing problem for today's high school administrators. School
boards have invariably enacted student dress codes that expressly forbid
long hair, requiring that it be "combed and worn so it does not hang
below the collar line in the back, over the ears on the side . . . [and]
above the eyebrows."' Students, however, have begun to assert their
right to wear their hair at any length they deem appropriate.
To date, eight major cases involving dress codes which prohibit
long hair have been decided. Four of the cases ruled in favor of the
students,' while the other cases held for the school boards.3 Each case
involved a high school boy with long hair, generally of the "Beatle" style,
who was suspended from school because of the length of his hair. A
majority of the suspensions were based upon dress code violations, and
in most of the cases the students were seeking readmission.
The purpose of this note is to reflect the current judicial attitude
toward the students' assertions of their constitutional right to wear their
hair at any length. Defiance, individualism and style constitute some of
the motivational factors which influence the students' attitude toward
these promulgated codes. These factors, however, should have little
relevancy in determining the students' constitutional rights.
HISTORY OF SCHOOL BOARD DIsCRETION
Since the inception of public education, those charged with the
education of children have been authorized to use such power as they
deemed necessary in the furtherance of a child's education.4 This
authority has been granted to administrators on the theory that without it
1. Williams Bay High School Dress Code, Williams Bay High School, Williams
Bay, Wisconsin.
2. Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969) ; Griffin v. Tatum, 300 F. Supp.
60 (M.D. Ala. 1969); Miller v. Gillis, - F. Supp. - (N.D. Ill. 1969) ; Richards v.
Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 449 (D. Mass. 1969).
3. Ferrell v. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968)
Crews v. Cloncs, 303 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Ind. 1969) ; Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp.
524 (E.D. La. 1967) ; Leonard v. School Comm., 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965).
4. He [the parent] may also delegate part of his parental authority, during his
life, to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and
has such a portion of the power committed to his charge, viz. that of restraint
and correction, as may be necessary to answer the purposes for which he is em-
ployed.
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 374 (1883).
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the attempted educational process would become decidedly ineffective.
Generally, courts have held that parents, by sending their children to
school, have impliedly consented to reasonable rules and regulations
promulgated by the school authorities to ensure an orderly and academic
atmosphere.'
The power to create and supervise schools and school systems is
reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment.' State legislatures, in
turn, have delegated all matters of education to the states' departments of
education. 7  Pursuant to such grants, these departments have been
allowed a great degree of discretion in dealing with school administration
and pupil conduct.8 These statutes have been interpreted as evidencing an
intent to minimize the number of school-student controversies reaching
the courts.9 Some controversies, however, have resulted in litigation, but
the consensus of those cases appears to be that courts will not interfere
with a school board's decision" unless there is a compelling reason for
intervention."
Courts have been reluctant to adjudicate school-student controversies
5. W. PROSSER, THE LAW oF TORTS 139 (3rd ed. 1964).
6. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958); Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 U.S. 5 (1880);
Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. 713 (1865).
7. For example, New York has vested such power in the following manner:
There shall continue to be in the state government an education department.
The department is charged with the general management and supervision of all
public schools and of all the educational work of the state ....
N.Y. EDUC. § 101 (McKinney 1953).
8. Illinois is fairly representative and has granted the following discretion to the
school boards: "To adopt and enforce all necessary rules for the management and gov-
eminent of the public schools of their district." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-20.5
(Smith-Hurd 1961).
9. Bullock v. Cooley, 225 N.Y. 566, 122 N.E. 630 (1919); Van Allen v. McCleary,
211 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
10. Robinson v. School Dist., 53 Cal. Rptr. 781 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (school pro-
hibited school fraternities and sororities) ; John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510,
102 So. 637 (1925) (student claims to have been maliciously expelled) ; Robinson v. Il-
linois High School Ass'n, 45 Ill. App. 2d 277, 195 N.E.2d 38 (1963) (school prohibited
pupil from participating in school sports); School Dist. v. Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 147
N.W.2d 854 (1967) (school excluded married students from participating in extracur-
ricular activities); Board of Educ. v. Luster, 282 S.W.2d 333 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955)
(school prohibited students from eating at a local cafe) ; Watson v. Cambridge, 32 N.E.
864 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1893) (student expelled for mental incapacity) ; Jones v. Day,
127 Miss. 136, 89 So. 906 (1921) (school required students to wear a khaki uniform to
school) ; Richardson v. Braham, 125 Neb. 142, 249 N.W. 557 (1933) (students prevented
from leaving school premises during school hours) ; Worley v. Allen, 12 App. Div. 2d
411, 212 N.Y.S.2d 236 (1961) (teacher fired for failure to follow school board regula-
tions); Stromberg v. French, 60 N.D. 750, 236 N.W. 477 (1931) (school prohibited heel
taps); State v. Chamberlain, 30 Ohio Op. 2d 262, 175 N.E.2d 539 (C.P. 1961) (school
refused to readmit pregnant student) ; Stanley v. Gary, 237 S.C. 237, 116 S.E.2d 843
(1960) (school principal permitted to yell at students) ; Moseley v. Dallas, 118 Tex. 461,
17 S.W.2d 36 (1929) (school required students to visit school health clinic).
11. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
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for several reasons." First, school boards have been endowed with
statutory authority to operate and manage learning institutions in any
manner they deem necessary for the educational instruction of the stu-
dents; the courts have recognized that the management of schools is not a
judicial function."3 In addition, the judiciary has refrained from en-
croaching upon the authority of school boards because of our govern-
mental separation of powers doctrine."
Another reason for judicial abstention is that school systems are
managed by professional educators who are deemed more competent in
educational matters than the courts. Commenting on this point, the
court in Robinson v. School District5 stated:
School boards are professionals in this field knowing what will
harm morals and discipline of students, the courts are laymen;
the boards are close to the day-to-day affairs of the pupils of
secondary schools and the problems which arise in a school
community, courts are removed therefrom. Under the circum-
stances, we cannot superimpose our judgment over theirs and
should not attempt to do so. 6
School officials are familiar with a particular school's needs and problems.
Their preparatory education and teaching experience have acquainted
them with the more successful teaching techniques and the rules and
regulations necessary to implement such techniques. The courts have
realized this'7 and have refrained from passing judgment as to the
wisdom of implemented school regulations."
A third reason for judicial reluctance is the influence of stare decisis.
Historically, school boards have been allowed broad discretion both from
their statutory inception and from the well-established doctrine of in
12. In Board of Educ. v. Bentley, 383 S.W.2d 677 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964), the court
declared: "Courts will not interfere with the school board's exercise of such discretion
unless it appears the board has acted arbitrarily or maliciously." Id. at 679. Subse-
quently, in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), the Supreme Court stated that
"[c]ourts do not and cannot intervene in the resolutions of conflicts which arise in the
daily operation of school systems and which do not directly and sharply implicate basic
constitutional values." Id. at 104. Accord, State ex rel. Evans v. Fry, 11 Ohio Misc.
231, 230 N.E.2d 363 (C.P. 1967), where the court held: "No court has the authority to
control the discretion vested in a board of education, unless there has been a gross abuse
of discretion." Id. at 364.
13. Stanley v. Gary, 237 S.C. 237, 116 S.E.2d 843 (1960). The court stated that
"[t]he maintenance of discipline and the standards of behavior in a body of students in
a high school is a task committed to its faculty and officers and not to the courts."
Id. at 846.
14. School Dist. v. Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 147 N.W.2d 854 (1967).
15. 53 Cal. Rptr. 781 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
16. Id. at 789.
17, Wilson v. School Dist., 190 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
18. Brown v. Greer, 296 F. Supp. 595 (S.D. Miss. 1969).
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loco parentis.19 As a result, most cases have been decided in favor of the
school boards.2" This trend has been perpetuated by virtue of the doctrine
of stare decisis 2" and has thereby become deeply imbedded in our judicial
system.22 Thus, courts are ordinarily reluctant to litigate school regulatory
problems unless the deprivation of a constitutional right is in issue.2 8
THE FIRST AMENDMENT ARGUMENT
Most of the students in the recent "hair" cases have maintained that
their long hair is a manifestation of some cultural ideology"4 and have
insisted that their right to wear it in such manner is secured by the free
speech provision of the First Amendment." While the courts have
acknowledged the existence of a right to symbolic speech,2" it has not yet
been made clear exactly what type of conduct or action the right en-
compasses.
Of the recent "hair" cases, only two courts have expressly held that
long hair did not fall within the protection of First Amendment symbolic
speech.2" The apparent reasoning was that long hair was not "a symbol
of some easily identifiable idea."2 Miller v. Gillis20 held that it was
nothing more than the "mere exercise of the wearer's choice of hair-
style."8 The test espoused by Miller was that the objects seeking protec-
tion must be "symbols of movements or ideas easily expressed and readily
identifiable."2 1 The court arrived at this test after a study of previously
decided "symbolic expression" cases, in particular Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District.82
19. BLACKSTONE, supra note 4.
20. See note 10 supra.
21. Neff v. George, 364 Ill. 306, 4 N.E.2d 388 (1936) ; Moore v. Albany, 98 N.Y.
396 (1885).
22. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 42 (Gavit ed. 1892).
23. See note 11 supra.
24. The plaintiff in Richards v. Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 449 (D. Mass. 1969), ex-
plained that his long hair was a symbol
to indicate his association with some of the younger generation in expressing
their independent aesthetic and social outlook and their determination to reject
many of the customs and values of some of the older generation.
Id. at 455.
25. Miller v. Gillis, - F. Supp. (N.D. II. 1969).
26. Tinker v. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1968) ; Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943) ; Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
27. Miller v. Gillis, - F. Supp. - (N.D. Ill. 1969); Davis v. Firment, 269 F.
Supp. 524 (ED. La. 1967).
28. Miller v. Gillis, - F. Supp. - (N.D. Ill. 1969).
29. Id.
30. Id. at -
31. Id. at-
32. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). For a full discussion of the Tinker decision see note 56
infra and accompanying text.
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The court in Davis v. Firment" more specifically defined a symbol
as being "a vehicle by which a concept is transmitted from one person
to another. . . ."" In addition, the court stated that unless the "symbol"
represents "a specific idea or viewpoint," it becomes meaningless and
"in effect, not really a symbol at all." 5 To the court the meaning of long
hair was ambiguous and, without discussion, it concluded that the
student's long hair did not symbolize anything."6 The court apparently
desired a more concrete idea or viewpoint for a symbol. For example, it
has been held that displaying a flag was symbolic of approval of that
which the flag represented,"' and that a Jehovah's Witness' refusal to
salute a flag was symbolic of a religious belief.3 8
Leonard v. School Committee"6 was the only case which failed to
respond to the First Amendment argument." Breen v. Kahl1 discounted
the argument by stating that while long hair might be a mode of
symbolish speech which evidences some form of youthful cultural revolt,"2
in their view of the matter it was unnecessary to decide the issue con-
clusively.4" The contention that long hair constituted symbolic expression
was also rejected in Griffin v. Tatum4" where the court stated: "This
Court does not find it necessary to reach or decide plaintiff's First
Amendment contention....
Two of the remaining three cases, Ferrell v. Dallas Independent
School District46 and Crews v. Cloncs, did not expressly decide whether
long hair constituted protected symbolic expression. They both assumed,
ad arguendo, that long hair was a form of protected expression and then
proceeded to reject the students' contention by pointing out that symbolic
speech is not an absolute right and that it may be curtailed by the state if
justified by compelling reasons.4 ' The Ferrell court was zealous in pro-
tecting the authority of the school board and emphatic about its position.
33. 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967).
34. Id. at 527.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
3& Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 1178 (1943).
39. 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965).
40. The Leonard case was decided on non-constitutional grounds.
41. 296 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Wis.), afj'd, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969).
42. Id. at 705.
43. The court ultimately ruled in favor of the student maintaining that the regula-
tion was violative of the due process clause. See note 79 infra and accompanying text.
44. 300 F. Supp. 60 (M.D. Ala. 1969).
45. Id. at 62. The court ultimately ruled in favor of the student holding that the
hair regulation violated the due process clause.
46. 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968).
47. 303 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Ind. 1969).
48. 392 F.2d at 703; 303 F. Supp. at 1375.
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The compelling reason for the State infringement with which
we deal is obvious. The interest of the state in maintaining an
effective and efficient school system is of paramount importance.
That which so interferes or hinders the state in providing the
best education possible for its people, must be eliminated or
circumscribed as needed. This is true even when that which is
condemned is the exercise of a constitutionally protected
right.49
The Crews5" court took essentially the same position,51 but went
one step further. In attempting to justify the curtailment of this right, the
court took the position that " 'pure speech' [was] not involved but
rather conduct which reflects or is imbued with speech or opinion."52
The court seems to imply that "pure speech" occupies a "preferred
position" over symbolic speech and, therefore, a lesser compelling reason
might be sufficient to infringe one's right of symbolic expression than is
necessary to infringe one's right of "pure speech." 5
In the remaining case, Richards v. Thurston,54 after hearing plain-
tiff's First Amendment contention, the court unenthusiastically stated that
symbolic speech might be a valid argument. The court, however, pro-
ceeded with the case without further mention of this First Amendment
contention.55
Three of the most important cases in the area of symbolic speech
are Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,56
Burnside v. Byars57 and Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of
Education.58 Each involved high school students, and in all but Blackwell
the courts upheld the students' right of symbolic speech.
49. 392 F.2d at 703. The court failed to discuss, however, the well-established doc-
trine which states that in reaching any lawful end that course of action must be taken
which least infringes on the rights of the individual. See note 125 infra and accompany-
ing text.
50. 303 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Ind. 1969).
51. [It is clear that the right to free expression is not absolute, and that it
may be infringed by state authority upon a showing of a compelling reason ....
Here the interest of the state is in maintaining an orderly and efficient
school system, an academic atmosphere in which knowledge can be peacefully
transmitted to the pupils. The importance of this state interest cannot be
overstated.
Id. at 1375.
52. Id.
53. It has been held that even "pure speech" rights are not absolute, but subject to
restrictions. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
54. 304 F. Supp. 449 (D. Mass. 1969).
55. See note 24 supra. The court ultimately ruled in favor of the student and main-
tained that the regulation was violative of the due process clause.
56. 393 U.S. 503 (1968).
57. 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
58. 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 4, No. 2 [1070], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol4/iss2/8
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
In Tinker, the students wore black armbands to school to protest
the United States' involvement in Vietnam. Fearing that the conduct of
the students would cause disruption in the school, the school authorities
suspended the students. The Supreme Court upheld the students' right to
wear the armbands maintaining that the exercise of symbolic expression
was closely akin to "pure speech" and was thereby entitled to the com-
prehensive protection of the First Amendment.29 The Court qualified this
right, however, saying that it could only be exercised if it did not collide
with the rights of others." Since the wearing of armbands created no
disorder or disturbances6' the students' right to freedom of expression
was honored. The Court, however, did intimate that if substantial school
disruptions had resulted, their decision would have been otherwise.2 The
Court further restricted their holding by stating that "[t]he problem
presented by the present case does not relate to regulation of the length of
skirts or the type of clothing, to hair style or deportment .... Our pro-
blem involves direct, primary First Amendment rights akin to 'pure
speech'."6 This would seem to imply that long hair is not a protected
right "akin to pure speech."
Burnside and Blackwell were decided by the same court of appeals
and dealt with high school students suspended for wearing "freedom
buttons ' 6 4 to school. In both cases the students wore the buttons "as a
means of silently communicating an idea and to encourage the members
of their community to exercise their civil rights."65 Both courts held that
the buttons constituted symbolic expression of the type secured by the
First Amendment.6 Although Burnside ruled in favor of the students,
59. 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1968).
60. Id. at 513. The theory is that students are entitled to an education in a school
with a healthy academic atmosphere with a minimum of disruptions.
61. Id. at 50&
62. The school officials banned and sought to punish petitioners for a silent,
passive, expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbances on
the part of petitioners. There is no evidence whatever of petitioners' interfer-
ence, actual or nascent, with the school's work or of collision with the rights of
other students to be secure and to be let alone.
Id.
63. Id.
64. The buttons were circular, approximately 11/2 inches in diameter, contain-
ing the wording "One Man One Vote" around the perimeter with "SNCC" in-
scribed in the center.
Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 746 (1966).
The buttons were about an inch in diameter depicting a black and white hand
joined together with "SNCC" inscribed in the margin.
Blackwell v. Board of Educ., 363 F.2d 749, 750 (1966).
65. 363 F.2d 744, 747 (1966).
66. [T]he regulation forbidding the wearing of "freedom buttons" on school
grounds is arbitrary and unreasonable, and an unnecessary infringement on the
students' protected right of free expression ....
Id. at 748.
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Blackwell held for the school board. The distinguishing factor was that no
disruption was caused by the presence of the buttons in Burnside," while
substantial commotion and school disturbance occurred in Blackwell.8
The principle espoused by those cases is that the right of symbolic expres-
sion may be abridged when it infringes upon the rights of others; the dif-
ficult problem is to decide what degree of disruption is a sufficient in-
fringement to warrant the curtailment of symbolic speech.
It would seem that for a symbol to qualify for First Amendment
protection it must definitely symbolize some easily recognizable idea or
belief.6" "Freedom buttons" and black armbands are absolute symbols-
symbols protected as free speech;"0 each has become recognized as
symbolizing an identifiable idea or belief. Under the present guidelines,
however, it does not appear that long hair constitutes such a symbol that
deserves free speech protection. Even though long hair is theoretically a
symbol, the courts have refused to grant it First Amendment protection
because it fails to convey a specific idea or concept.7
Another possible reason for the court's reluctance to accept long hair
as a secured symbol is that there is no pressing necessity for such a
decision. Realizing the difficulty in deciding whether this symbol war-
rants free speech protection,"2 the courts appear relieved to discover that
the controversies before them could be decided by the application of other
amendments." Although it might be said that this is the "easy way out,"
or that the court is being evasive and hedging, it could also be argued that
the courts are adhering to the doctrine of judicial abstention."' Tradition-
ally, the Supreme Court has refused to decide constitutional questions
unless it is absolutely necessary." Since the cases dealing with long hair
can be decided with less difficulty on the basis of the Fourteenth Amend-
The court said this case involved "regulations limiting freedom of expression and
the communication of an idea which are protected by the First Amendment." 363 F.2d
749, 753 (1966).
67. "The record indicates only a showing of mild curiosity on the part of the other
school children . . . ." 363 F.2d 744, 748 (1966).
68. "This activity [students attempting to put buttons on other students] created a
state of confusion, disrupted class instruction, and resulted in a general breakdown of
orderly discipline .... " 363 F.2d 749, 751 (1966).
69. See notes 28 and 31 supra and accompanying text.
70. Tinker v. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) ; Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744
(5th Cir. 1966).
71. Miller v. Gillis, - F. Supp. - (N.D. Ill. 1969) ; Davis v. Firment, 269
F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967).
72. Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702, 705 (W.D. Wis.), aff'd, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th
Cir. 1969).
73. The courts invariably discuss the First and the Ninth Amendments in addition
to the Fourteenth Amendment; they usually, however, decide the case pursuant to the
Fourteenth.
74. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
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ment, 6 there is no need for the courts to utilize the First Amendment.
THE DUE PROCESS ARGUMENT
One of the arguments asserted by the students concerning the
Fourteenth Amendment is that they were deprived of their "liberty"
without due process of law. The liberty for which protection is sought is
the freedom of one to present himself to the world as he sees fit. 7
The four cases holding in favor of the students"8 were decided
primarily on the basis that the students were denied due process of law.
The court in Breen v. Kah79 held that "[t]he right to wear one's hair
at any length or in any desired manner is an ingredient of personal
freedom protected by the United States Constitution."" The court
admitted, however, that this freedom could be abridged by the state,
but only if the state was able to meet a "substantial burden of justifica-
tion."'" To determine this issue the court balanced the individual's
right to exercise his liberty to present himself to society as he sees fit
against the right of the other students to receive an orderly education with
a minimum of disruption. Noting that no substantial commotion was
caused by the students' long hair,8 2 the court concluded that the school
board had failed to adequately justify the promulgation of such a rule.
In Richards v. Thurston,8 Judge Wyzanski stated that a student's
"claim to liberty as to his appearance is entitled to protection from action
by the state or its agents ... under the broad terms of the 'due process'
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."84 Conceding that such a liberty
could be curtailed, Judge Wyzanski said that "the state must [first]
make a strong showing of the need [for] its curtailment."85 After
reviewing the record, Judge Wyzanski concluded that there was no
apparent reason for the regulation other than the satisfaction of the
principal's own preference as to hair length.8
Griffin v. Tatum 7 took the position that "there can be little doubt
that the Constitution protects the freedom to determine one's own hair-
75. Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339 (1892).
76. See notes 77 and 107 infra and accompanying text.
77. Richards v. Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 449, 455 (D. Mass. 1969).
78. See note 2 supra.
79. 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969).
80. Id. at 1036.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1037.
83. 304 F. Supp. 449 (D. Mass. 1969).
84. Id. at 453.
85. Id. at 452.
86. Id. at 451.
87. 300 F. Supp. 60 (M.D. Ala. 1969).
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style and otherwise to govern one's personal appearance.""8 The court
felt that such a freedom afforded individuals "the right to some breathing
space . . . into which the government may not intrude without carrying a
substantial burden of justification."" Since the record disclosed no harm
to others as a result of the student's long hair" the court determined that
the burden of justification had not been met by the school. In Miller v.
Gillis,"' the court found that there was a "highly protected freedom of
people to present themselves physically to the world in the manner of
their own individual choice"9 2 and that since the school board could show
no compelling reason for the existence of the rule, the constitutionally
secured freedom should take precedence over the unfounded rule.9
It is interesting to note that none of the courts which ruled for the
school boards 4 mentioned the due process clause even though it con-
stituted one of the students' primary arguments." On the other hand,
it is apparent that the courts which held for the students recognized that
the right of a person to wear his hair as he sees fit constitutes a "liberty"
of the type secured by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 8
While the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that one will not be
deprived of his "liberty . . .without due process of law,"97 there is no
mention as to what constitutes a protected liberty. Although the term
"liberty" almost defies definition, the Supreme Court, in Allegeyer v.
Louisiana,"8 stated:
The liberty mentioned in that amendment means not only the
right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint
of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to
embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of
all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways ... "
88. Id. at 62. The court cited Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Wis.),
aff'd, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), as authority. See note 84 supra and accompanying
text.
89. 300 F. Supp. 60, 62 (1969).
90. The court held that "[t]he school authorities' 'justification,' or the reasons they
advance for the necessity for such a haircut rule completely fail." Id. at 63.
91. - F. Supp. - (N.D. Ill. 1969).
92. Id. at -
93. Id. at -
94. See note 3 supra.
95. Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967). The court did, however,
discuss and reject the student's other three arguments based on the First, Eighth and
Ninth Amendments.
96. See notes 83 and 88 supra and accompanying text.
97. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
98. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
99. Id. at 589.
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Subsequently, the Court in Meyer v. Nebraska,' expanded the term
"liberty" so as to include other specific rights.
Without doubt it denotes not merely freedom from bodily re-
straint but also the right of the individual to contract, to
engage in any of the individual occupations of life, to acquire
any useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of one's own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long re-
cognized in common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men.''
Other court decisions have offered additional clarifications of the term
"liberty."'0 2
There appears to be a concept which permeates all suggested de-
finitions of this term. Inherent in each is deference to a principle which is
more aged than any written law and which transcends the whole Bill of
Rights-thought is not patterned. Thought cannot be controlled and will
inevitably evidence itself through conduct. Each man must live his per-
sonal life as he sees fit. Our founding fathers realized this and in drafting
the Bill of Rights ensured the continued existence of this natural right.
It would seem that since the Consitution grants to every person the
liberty to use all his faculties in any lawful manner,"3 and "to enjoy
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men,"'"" the choice of hair style, being
such a personal matter, would fall well within these protected confines.
The liberty to determine one's own hair style relates to how a man
100. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
101. Id. at 399.
102. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (the right to travel is
such a liberty) ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (the right to the liberty
secured by the First Amendment provisions) ; Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (the
right to use all public streets and public places) ; Wall v. King, 206 F.2d 878 (1st Cir.
1953) (the right to make use of one's own property) ; Thomas v. District of Columbia,
90 F.2d 424 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (the right to be governed by "laws which hear before they
condemn") ; Beauregard v. Wingard, 230 F. Supp. 167 (S.D. Cal. 1964) (the right to
freedom from arrest and freedom from imprisonment except through due process of
law) ; Dominguez v. Denver, 147 Colo. 233, 363 P.2d 661 (1961) (the right to further
one's business and pleasure concerns); Zavilla v. Masse, 112 Colo. 183, 147 P.2d 823
(1944) (freedom of choice in matters of purely personal concern) ; Fitzsimmons v. New
York Athletic Comm'n, 146 N.Y.S. 117, aff'd, 162 App. Div. 904, 147 N.Y.S. 1111 (Sup.
Ct. 1914) (the right to freedom by the imposition of restraint on others) ; State v. Bal-
lance, 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731 (1949) (the right to enjoy and use all the faculties
with which man has been endowed by his creator); Block v. Schwartz, 27 Utah 387,
76 P. 22 (1904) (the right to purchase, hold and sell property) ; Bulova Watch Co. v.
Zale Jewelry Co., 371 P.2d 409 (Wyo. 1962) (the right to do all which is not unlawful).
103. Allegeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
104. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
410
et al.: High School Hair Regulations
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1070
HAIR REGULATIONS
presents himself to society. It is a right so personal and fundamental that
unwarranted curtailment of it would be tantamount to oppression. In-
dividuality should not be stifled.
As personal as this right is, it is not exempt from regulation."' The
rights of a person to present himself to the world as he sees fit are
paramount "until one's appearance carries with it a substantial risk of
harm to others."1 ° Applying this test to the "hair" cases it would
seem that restrictions on hairstyle should not be imposed unless the right
of other students to receive an orderly education is thereby jeopardized.
THE EQUAL PROTECTION ARGUMENT
In many of the "hair" cases the students claimed that the hair
regulations were unreasonable and arbitrary and therefore denied them
the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." 7 Five courts made no mention of this argument.' 8 One court,
while deciding for the school board,0 9 discussed the issue and conceded
that the student might have been discriminated against, but held that
"only invidious discrimination 
. . . is prohibited by the Fourteenth
Amendment.""' Considering the regulation to be in the furtherance of a
vital state interest-undisturbed public education-the court found no
denial of equal protection.
Griffin v. Tatum"' and Miller v. Gillis". decided that the hair
regulations were violative of equal protection; both, however, decided in
favor of the students on the basis of the due process clause."' In Griffin
the court stated:
[I]n this instance the application of the haircut rule to this
plaintiff . . . constitutes an arbitrary and unreasonable classifica-
tion; for that reason, the invocation of the rule as a basis for
suspending the plaintiff as a student from this public school
clearly violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' 4
105. Griffin v. Tatum, 300 F. Supp. 60 (M.D. Ala. 1969).
106. Id. at 62.
107. Crews v. Cloncs, 303 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Ind. 1969).
108. Breen v. Kahl, 419, F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969) ; Ferrell v. School Dist., 392
F.2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968); Richards v. Thurston, 304 F.
Supp. 449 (D. Mass. 1969); Davis v. Firment, 369 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967);
Leonard v. School Comm_, 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965).
109. Crews v. Cloncs, 303 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Ind. 1969).
110. Id. at 1376 (emphasis added).
111. 300 F. Supp. 60 (M.D. Ala. 1969).
112. - F. Supp. - (N.D. Ill. 1969).
113. See note 78 supra and accompanying text.
114. 300 F. Supp. 60, 62 (1969).
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The court felt that the rule imposed "an utterly unreasonable condition
to the plaintiff's continuing as a student.""' 5
The Miller court, in finding a denial of equal protection, applied a
rather extensive test to determine whether a regulation is repugnant to
the equal protection clause. According to the court, a regulation or rule
is repugnant if it falls within one or more of the following categories:
(1) The regulation is not necessary to the exercise of the
inherent police powers of the state to provide for the health,
education and general welfare of the people of that state; (2)
the regulation once promulgated is incapable of meeting the
need to which the regulation is directed; (3) the regulation
creates, by its enforcement an evil greater than that evil sought
to be corrected; and (4) the regulation is arbitrary in defining a
class of people to which it applies." 6
The court then proceeded to declare that the regulation denied long
haired students equal protection because it created an arbitrary class of
those few wishing to wear their hair long.17
Since the courts have taken judicial notice of the importance of an
education,' and in many states students are required by law to attend
school,'19 it may be argued that a regulation which denies a student an
education solely on the basis of the length of his hair results in unjust
discrimination and is therefore unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court has given some indication as to the interpreta-
tion of the equal protection clause and has held that only "invidious
discrimination" is prohibited by the provision.' It would appear that
hair regulations would constitute "invidious discrimination" if they were
promulgated merely at the whim of the school principal and not in the
furtherance of a legitimate governmental objective.
Invariably, the legitimate governmental objective given by the school
115. Id.
116. - F. Supp. at--
117. Id. at
118. In Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), Mr. Chief Justice Warren
stated:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local gov-
ernments . . . . It is the very foundation of good citizenship . ... In these
days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life
if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
Id. at 493. See Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Wis.), afF'd, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th
Cir. 1969), wherein Judge Doyle stated: "I . . . [take] judicial notice of the social,
economic, and psychological value and importance today of receiving a public education
through twelfth grade." Id. at 704.
119. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 76, § 1 (1964); N.Y. EDUC. § 3205 (McKinney 1953);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1327 (1962).
120. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
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boards is the maintainence of a peaceful, academic atmosphere in the
schools.'' It would seem, however, that this objective may be attained in
a variety of ways which would not abridge one's liberty to choose his
hair style.' When dealing with fundamental liberties the Supreme Court
has held that "precision of regulation must be the touchstone." 2
Therefore, if a valid objective may be reached by either of two means, the
chosen means should be the one that will result in the least infringement
upon the rights of individuals. 2 '
If a commotion arises because a student wears long hair, the school
can choose either of two means to prevent further disruptions: 1) enforce
a prescribed haircut to which everyone is to conform; or 2) reprimand
only those who actually cause the commotion. In accordance with the
Supreme Court's decision in Shelton v. Tucker,2 ' the school board must
achieve its objective by choosing that course of action which least in-
fringes upon the individual rights and liberties of the students. This
would suggest that the second alternative is the most appropriate. The
school board's power to initiate rules in the furtherance of managing the
schools is not contested, 2' but such rules should not be promulgated and
enforced indiscriminately. It would seem that a student's education should
not be conditioned on a rule that all students have a prescribed haircut
when the objective sought might be achieved by a less imposing alterna-
tive-punishing only the students creating the commotion. The student
and the school administrator have exactly the same constitutional rights ;127
both are individuals, and each deserves respect from the other.'28
121. Crews v. Cloncs, 303 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Ind. 1969). In that case, the school
board maintained that long hair disrupted the "classroom atmosphere . . . and resulted
in the distraction of other students so as to interfere with the educational process in the
high school." Id. at 1373.
122. Griffin v. Tatum, 300 F. Supp. 60, 63 (M.D. Ala. 1969), intimated that various
disciplinary measures should be taken in lieu of requiring the students to wear their hair
at a prescribed length.
123. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265 (1967), citing NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
124. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265 (1967).
125. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
126. This Court recognizes and has in the past recognized, the basic principle
that school authorities are possessed with the power and the duty to establish
and enforce regulations to deal with activities which may materially and sub-
stantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the school.
Griffin v. Tatum, 300 F. Supp. 60, 62 (M.D. Ala. 1969).
127. Miller v. Gillis, - F. Supp. - , - (N.D. Ill. 1969).
128. All, too, will bear in mind this sacred principle, that though the will of the
majority is in all cases to prevail, that will, to be rightful, must be reasonable;
that the minority possess their equal rights, which equal laws must protect,
and to violate which would be oppression.
1 EMERSON, HABER & DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 6
(1967), citing the First Inaugural Address of Thomas Jefferson, March 4, 1801.
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CONCLUSION
The single factor which seems to influence the courts most is the
absence or presence of a bona fide disciplinary problem. Three courts
found that there were no disciplinary problems created as a result of the
students' hair length.'29 Accordingly, they saw no reason for presently
abridging the students' rights. 3 ' In only one case did the record show that
the students' long hair caused substantial school disturbances and the court
therefore held for the school board.' Another court held that as long as
hair could or might create disruption, the school board's rule would be sus-
tained.' 2 In the three remaining cases, the only evidence of any commo-
tion was from uncorroborated statements made by the principals or a
school board's statement that disruption did exist.' In Ferrell v. Dallas
Independent School District... and Davis v. Firment"' the courts decided
that this was sufficient evidence to justify upholding the school's hair rule.
Griffin v. Tatum,"3 6 however, declared that such evidence was not sub-
stantial enough to necessitate the curtailment of a constitutional right.
The cases which decided for the students.'. indicated, however, that
if sufficient evidence has been introduced to show substantial disruption,
and that other disciplinary action had proven to be ineffective, the school
regulations might have been sustained.' In this respect the cases are
consistent.
No one would contest the school's right to require a recalcitrant
student to have a specific haircut if it was found to be the only way to
preclude school disturbances. The rights of the other students to receive
an education in an academic atmosphere should be paramount in such a
case. But this method should be resorted to only if: 1) there are no less
stringent disciplinary measures to secure the desired end; and 2) the
commotion was caused directly by the presence of the long hair. The
latter requirement is an attempt to exclude those cases in which the
commotion was caused indirectly by the long hair. For instance, should
129. Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969) ; Miller v. Gillis, - F. Supp.
- (N.D. Ill. 1969) ; Richards v. Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 449 (D. Mass. 1969).
130. Miller v. Gillis, - F. Supp. - (N.D. Ill. 1969).
131. Crews v. Cloncs, 303 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Ind. 1969).
132. Leonard v. School Comrm., 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965).
133. Ferrell v. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856
(1968) ; Griffin v. Tatum, 300 F. Supp. 60 (M.D. Ala. 1969); Davis v. Firment, 269 F.
Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967).
134. 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968).
135. 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967).
136. 300 F. Supp. 60 (M.D. Ala. 1969).
137. See note 2 supra.
138. "It must be shown, and clearly so, that the particular style of dress and ap-
pearance complained of would in fact be actually disruptive." Miller v. Gillis, - F.
Supp. - , - (N.D. Ill. 1969).
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other students taunt, intimidate and ridicule the long haired student, the
ensuing disturbance would be the result of the irresponsible acts of the
other students." 9 In such a case, the rowdy students, not the long haired
student, should be the subject of disciplinary action-a person handing
out leaflets on a street corner cannot be prosecuted for littering because
the people who accept them throw the leaflets in the street. 40 Some other
method, then, must be devised to ensure school tranquility; it cannot be
attained by supressing those who wish to exercise their constitutional
rights. 4 ' Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Ferrell v. Dallas Independent
School District, demonstrated the inequity of such supression when he
stated:
It comes as a surprise that in a country where the states are
restrained by an Equal Protection Clause, a person can be
denied education in public school because of the length of his
hair. I suppose that a nation bent on turning out robots might
insist that every male have a crew cut and every female wear pig-
tails. But the ideas of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,"
expressed in the Declaration of Independence, later found
specific definiton in the Constitution itself, including of course
freedom of expression and a wide zone of privacy. I had
supposed these guarantees permitted idiosyncrasies to flourish,
especially when they concern the image of one's personality
and his philosophy toward government and his fellow men.'42
The judicial trend is definitely in favor of the students, 4 ' and there
is no indication that this trend will reverse itself. The Supreme Court has
denied certiorari to the only party petitioning for review.14 ' At that time,
however, there was no conflict between the various federal courts on the
constitutional issue of long hair. 45 Today there is a conflict" 6-the Fifth
139. An example of disruption which is directly caused by long hair would be
where the long haired student's mere presence in the classroom would
disrupt the classroom atmosphere, impede classroom decorum, cause disturbances
among other students in attendance, and result in the distraction of other stu-
dents so as to interfere with the educational process in the high school.
Crews v. Cloncs, 303 F. Supp. 1370, 1373 (S.D. Ind. 1969).
140. Scheider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
141. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
142. Ferrell v. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856
(1968).
143. Chronologically, the first three cases were all decided for the school board
while four of the last five held for the student. See notes 2-3 supra and accompany-
ig text.
144. Ferrell v. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856
(1968).
145. Ferrell and Breen are the only cases which have been argued before United
States Courts of Appeal.
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Circuit has ruled for the school board" 7 and the Seventh Circuit has
decided for the student.""' Although these cases might be consistent with
each other,"9 it seems probable that the Supreme Court will eventually
grant certiorari, and it is submitted that the Court will uphold the rights
of the student to determine his own hair style.
146. The conflict, however, is primarily among the United States District Courts.
147. Ferrell v. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856
(1968).
148. Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969).
149. See note 138 supra and accompanying text.
et al.: High School Hair Regulations
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1070
